Everyone is familiar with the idea of the human body as a machine, a product of Darwinian evolution, with the main feature of surviving long enough to have offspring. Since Darwin’s time the conclusions to be drawn from the theory of evolution have been abundantly clear: our values, our morals, our altruism, our arts are rooted in our biological nature. Human societies have developed notions of loyalty because they proved useful for the survival of the group. and thus of its members.

For some familiarity breeds contempt, and they continue their lives obliviously — they dismiss them as irrelevant to ordinary people, as matters of concern only to some highly-strung individuals who lack the tether of common sense. For others the constant awareness that they are determined and bound creatures can shrink their self-image, narrow the circle of responsibility. Let me not speak in generalities here: a teacher friend had a pupil present him with a doctor’s note. The note explained the boy had been diagnosed with a behavioural problem that made him lie compulsively.

Wilson does not emphasise the potential such knowledge has to restrict self-image, human freedom or ethical ambitions. He is in thrall to the Ionian Enchantment. Currently sociology, psychology, anthropology, political science, ethics, and art criticism each have rules specific to their domain. Each of these subjects is characterised by divisions into schools of followers. They also often involve close study of the works of the founder, unlike the hard sciences where almost nobody studies, e.g. Einstein’s original papers. Wilson wants to show how the humanities can and must be based on the hard sciences – this is what he terms consilience. In effect he wants to make the soft sciences turn hard. It is a pleasure to read this unashamed and robust argument for the unity of all knowledge. There are some great passages on the evolution of mind and culture. He lists the universals of culture, whch include joking, sports, and dream interpretation. In the future science will be able to ground such behaviours in genetics and epigentic rules. In other parts he looks at mother-child bonding, incest taboos, colour vocabularies, etc, and shows how how the first steps are been made at explaining these on the level of genetics and evolutionary biology.

he writes. Is human nature to be discovered by investigating the hundreds of societies that exist on earth, or is it to be revealed by the introspection and creative art of the individual? Wilson is clear that it is the former. His work is a triumphant yea-saying to the march of the consilient (reductionist if you prefer) point of view.

In discussing the distinguishing features of human thought, he mentions:

intuitive and dogmatic, bound up with specific emotional relationships rather than physical casuality, preoccupied with essences and metamorphosis, prone to use language for social interaction rather than as a conceptual tool . . .

. . . the same preliterate traits are commonplace in citizens of modern industrial societies. Systematic logico-deductive thought, which is very much a specialised product of Western culture, comes hard on the other hand, and is very rare.

There you have it – the crack that reveal both the strengths and weakness of the whole. For if this is human nature, then whence is the imperative to study science? Whence the imperative towards knowing the truth? The justification for imposing science on thousands of schoolchildren?

In a chapter on ethics he makes the claim that a true science of ethics would seek to form a code which best reflects the intuitive principles that are part of our heritage. A code which accords best with human nature. Similar principles would be applied to political science and practical politics.

This is frightening stuff. Yet where is the alternative source of guidance? If ought is not is, then what is? pleads Wilson. I don’t have the answers, I’m just pointing out that Wilson is inconsistent, and digs the ground from under himself.

He is lead at last to the fantastically evocative statement:

In other words it is human nature to be disatisfied with human nature. This is pretty much the starting point of existentialism:

Man is a power to be, an impulsion, a bounding-leap, a being in advance of hmself. But for Jaspers the human being tends to extend beyond human existence; for Heidegger there is nothing else but the world of man, thrust outside of himself and in front of himself . . . the human is always something more than what he is (immediately) even though he is not yet what he shall be.

This is from a standard book on existentialism – references bore me.

The book ends with a discussion of some environmental issues, and the future of mankind over the next century. It’s the best general science book I’ve read for a decade – dump Dawkins in the bin and put Penrose’s new book at the end of the shelf (it will be too difficult for you anyway), this work will equip you to better understand the untethered world we now inhabit.